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 It has been suggested that individual differences in interoception (the perception of 
the body’s internal state) can be divided into three distinct dimensions: interoceptive accuracy 
(performance on objective tests of interoceptive accuracy), interoceptive sensibility (self-
reported beliefs concerning one’s own interoception) and interoceptive awareness (a 
metacognitive measure indexed by the correspondence between interoceptive accuracy and 
interoceptive sensibility). Research conducted under this model underscores the importance 
of interoceptive awareness for a variety of disorder-specific and transdiagnostic symptoms. 
However, the clinical importance of interoceptive awareness means that this aspect of 
interoception warrants further scrutiny, and such scrutiny suggests that revision of the three-
dimensional model of interoception is necessary. In this theoretical paper, we outline such a 
revision, highlighting a need to distinguish not only how interoception is measured (objective 
measures vs. self-report) but also what is measured (accuracy vs. attention). The model 
refines how individual differences in interoception are categorised, with important 
consequences for the measurement of interoceptive awareness. Such a revision may help 
researchers to identify the strengths and weaknesses in interoception observed across clinical 
conditions, and to isolate clinically-relevant individual differences.  
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Theories linking individual differences in interoception (perception of the body’s 
internal state; Craig, 2003; Khalsa et al., 2018) to individual differences in cognitive ability 
and affective function, and to physical and mental health, are becoming increasingly common 
(e.g., Brewer, Happé, Cook, & Bird, 2015; Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley, 
2015; Khalsa et al., 2018; Murphy, Catmur, & Bird, 2018; Quattrocki & Friston, 2014). 
Given the increased focus on interoception, however, there is a growing need for a 
classification framework that categorises the various ways individuals may differ with respect 
to interoception. Perhaps the most well-known model (Garfinkel et al., 2015) proposes that 
interoception is a three-dimensional construct, comprising 1) interoceptive accuracy (as 
measured by performance on objective measures of interoception; e.g., heartbeat counting or 
detection tasks; Dale & Anderson, 1978; Katkin, Reed, & Deroo, 1983; Schandry, 1981; 
Whitehead, Drescher, Heiman, & Blackwell, 1977); 2) interoceptive sensibility (self-reported 
beliefs concerning one’s own interoception; measured using confidence ratings or 
questionnaires); and 3) interoceptive awareness (a metacognitive measure reflecting the 
correspondence between interoceptive accuracy and interoceptive sensibility, also referred to 
as interoceptive insight; Khalsa et al., 2018). Adoption of this model by a number of 
empirical studies has resulted in increased recognition of the importance of interoceptive 
awareness, with the correspondence between interoceptive accuracy and interoceptive 
sensibility emerging as a clinically relevant feature across a number of different disorders 
(Garfinkel et al., 2016; Paulus & Stein, 2006, 2010; Rae, Larsson, Garfinkel, & Critchley, 
2018), and being predictive of certain transdiagnostic psychiatric symptoms (Ewing et al., 
2017). The clinical importance of interoceptive awareness means that this aspect of 
interoception deserves further scrutiny, and such scrutiny may require the three-dimensional 
model of interoception to be revised. These issues are the focus of this theoretical paper.  
  
Interoceptive awareness is quantified by examining the correspondence between 
measures of interoceptive accuracy and interoceptive sensibility. As such, the measurement 
of interoceptive awareness depends upon the degree to which both interoceptive accuracy and 
interoceptive sensibility can be measured accurately, and how these measures are combined. 
Although the validity of certain measures of interoceptive accuracy are debated (e.g., 
Desmedt, Luminet, & Corneille, 2018; Khalsa, Rudrauf, Sandesara, Olshansky, & Tranel, 
2009; Murphy, Brewer, Hobson, Catmur, & Bird, 2018; Zamariola, Maurage, Luminet, & 
Corneille, 2018), the desirable qualities of a good measure are fairly self-evident: The test 
should measure the accuracy of perception of an unambiguously interoceptive signal by 
reference to an objective measure of that signal. In contrast, interoceptive sensibility is 
concerned with one’s self-reported beliefs regarding one’s ‘dispositional tendency to be 
internally self-focused and interoceptively cognisant’ (Garfinkel et al., 2015) and is typically 
measured using questionnaire measures such as the Porges Body Perception Questionnaire 
(BPQ; Porges, 1993) or confidence ratings during a task of interoceptive accuracy (Ehlers, 
Breuer, Dohn, & Fiegenbaum, 1995). Problematically, scores on these two commonly-used 
measures of interoceptive sensibility (i.e. questionnaire measures and confidence ratings) are 
not usually correlated with each other (e.g., Garfinkel et al., 2015; Murphy, Brewer, Plans et 
al., 2018). Furthermore, they have been reported to show differential relationships with 
interoceptive accuracy: whilst confidence ratings sometimes correlate with interoceptive 
accuracy, questionnaire measures like the BPQ typically do not (e.g., Critchley, Wiens, 
Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004; Ferentzi, Drew, Tihanyi, & Köteles, 2018; Garfinkel et 
al., 2015; Murphy, Brewer, Plans et al., 2018; though this may depend on the measure of 
interoceptive accuracy employed; see Forkmann et al., 2016; Garfinkel et al., 2015; Schulz, 
Lass-Hennemann, Sütterlin, Schächinger, & Vögele, 2013). Nevertheless, as interoceptive 
sensibility and interoceptive accuracy are not always correlated, such findings have been 
  
taken as evidence that interoceptive accuracy and interoceptive sensibility are distinct and 
dissociable (e.g., Garfinkel et al., 2015).  
Interoceptive awareness is typically calculated by assessing the correspondence 
between objectively-measured interoceptive accuracy using a specific test, and confidence 
judgements relating to performance on that test (Garfinkel et al., 2015). More recently, 
however, researchers have begun to examine the correspondence between interoceptive 
accuracy and interoceptive sensibility by using the BPQ as a measure of interoceptive 
sensibility (Garfinkel et al., 2016; Rae et al., 2018). Although this is typically referred to as 
‘trait interoceptive prediction error’ (TIPE) rather than interoceptive awareness, within the 
three-dimensional model of interoceptive ability TIPE must be a variant of interoceptive 
awareness because it indexes the correspondence between interoceptive accuracy and 
interoceptive sensibility. However, whilst TIPE and interoceptive awareness ostensibly 
measure the same thing (the correspondence between interoceptive accuracy and 
interoceptive sensibility) and have both been highlighted as clinically relevant (Ewing et al., 
2017; Garfinkel et al., 2016; Rae et al., 2018), they appear to be distinct; for example, whilst 
TIPE has been found to be atypical in people with Autism Spectrum Disorder, interoceptive 
awareness has not (Garfinkel et al., 2016). 
Given this ambiguous relationship between interoceptive awareness and TIPE, and 
their clinical relevance, there is a clear need for a theoretical model that can distinguish 
between the various ways individuals may differ with respect to interoception. Such a model 
would allow for greater precision when categorising the patterns of strengths and weaknesses 
in interoception across different psychiatric conditions, and may also facilitate more specific 
interventions. We therefore suggest a modification of the existing three-dimensional model of 
interoception, arguing instead for a 2 x 2 factorial model. The first factor refers to which of 
the two main features of interoceptive perception is the target of measurement: accuracy vs. 
  
attention1 (Figure 1). Here, accuracy refers to the degree to which one’s interoceptive 
perception is a veridical representation of the true state of the body, while attention refers to 
the degree to which interoceptive signals are the object of attention. The second factor relates 
to the type of measurement: objective vs self-report (of course, such a distinction also affects 
that which is measured; e.g. an individual’s interoceptive accuracy vs. their perception of 
their interoceptive accuracy). Such a 2 x 2 model gives rise to four core measures of 
interoceptive ability; 1) objective measurement of the accuracy of interoceptive perception 
(e.g., performance on objective measures of interoception such as the heartbeat tracking or 
detection procedures); 2) self-reported perception of interoceptive accuracy (i.e., one’s beliefs 
regarding the accuracy of one’s interoceptive percept, including confidence ratings (e.g., 
ratings on a visual analogue scale from ‘full perception/complete confidence’ to ‘total 
guess/no awareness’) or scores on questionnaires such as the Interoceptive Confusion 
Questionnaire or Interoceptive Accuracy Scale e.g., items such as ‘I can always accurately 
perceive when my heart is beating fast’; Brewer, Cook, & Bird, 2016; Murphy, Brewer, Plans 
et al., 2018); 3) objective interoceptive attention (e.g., objective measurement of the degree to 
which interoceptive signals are the object of attention, such as experience sampling methods2; 
see Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 2014) and 4) self-reported interoceptive attention (one’s 
beliefs regarding the degree to which interoceptive signals are the object of attention, for 
example the BPQ; e.g., items such as ‘during most situations I am aware of how hard my 
heart is beating’; Porges, 1993).  
[Figure 1] 
                                                             
1 Note that in previous descriptions of the model we used the term awareness rather than attention to refer to the 
degree to which interoceptive signals are the object of attention. However, given that the word ‘awareness’ has 
been used to refer to a number of different aspects of interoception in the past, to avoid unnecessary confusion 
we use the term ‘attention’ here.  
2 Note that an objective measure of interoceptive attention may rely on self-report (for example, in an 
experience-sampling procedure the participant might be repeatedly asked what is the object of their attention 
over the course of a day, week or month), but the proportion of time that interoceptive signals are the object of 
attention (relative to the proportion of time exteroceptive signals were the object of attention) can then be 
objectively determined.  
  
Like the three-dimensional model, therefore, our model highlights the importance of 
distinguishing between how interoception is measured (e.g., objectively or via self-report) but 
also incorporates what is being measured (e.g., attention or accuracy) in order to distinguish 
possible individual differences in interoception. Crucially, such a distinction holds important 
consequences for measurement of interoceptive awareness. In the existing three-dimensional 
model interoceptive awareness refers to the correspondence between measures of 
interoceptive accuracy and interoceptive sensibility – regardless of whether the measure of 
interoceptive sensibility relates to one’s perception of the accuracy of interoceptive 
perception (e.g., confidence ratings) or one’s beliefs regarding one’s degree of attention to 
interoceptive signals (e.g., the BPQ). However, as noted, existing data suggest that these two 
‘interoceptive awareness’ measures appear to quantify distinct aspects of interoception; for 
example, they often show differential associations with symptomology and differential 
patterning across disorders (Garfinkel et al., 2016; Rae et al., 2018). In accordance with this 
distinction, the 2 x 2 factorial model described above makes clear that it is possible to 
calculate two distinct metacognitive (correspondence) measures (Figure 1, black arrows): 1) 
the correspondence between objectively and subjectively measured interoceptive accuracy 
(‘awareness of interoceptive accuracy’)3, and 2) the correspondence between objectively and 
subjectively measured interoceptive attention (‘awareness of interoceptive attention’). Note 
that this suggestion does not invalidate existing studies which utilise the correspondence 
between subjective measurement of interoceptive attention (e.g., the BPQ) and objective 
measurement of interoceptive accuracy (e.g., tasks of cardiac interoceptive accuracy), or 
negate the demonstrated clinical utility of such a measure (which is indicated by the white 
arrows in Figure 1). Rather, it provides a conceptual framework within which the different 
                                                             
3 One’s perception of, for example, one’s interoceptive accuracy may be measured using confidence ratings 
specific to a particular interoceptive signal at a particular point in time, or by trait measures assessing perceived 
accuracy across multiple interoceptive signals and across time. Accordingly, although awareness of 
interoceptive accuracy can be calculated using both measures, calculations using a trait measure would be less 
specific (with respect to interoceptive signal and time-point) than those using confidence judgements. 
  
measures of interoceptive awareness may be distinguished, and highlights that an accuracy: 
attention correspondence measure does not meet the typical requirement for a metacognitive 
measure: that the correspondence is calculated between objective and subjective measures of 
the same thing (e.g. objective measurement of interoceptive accuracy and subjective 
perception of interoceptive accuracy; e.g., Fleming & Dolan, 2012).  
 Such a framework for quantifying individual differences in interoception goes some 
way to explain the mixed results in the literature concerning the relationship between 
different measures of interoceptive sensibility, and the relationship between interoceptive 
accuracy and interoceptive sensibility, as reported inconsistences align with distinctions 
proposed by the 2x2 factorial model. For example, self-report measures of interoceptive 
attention (e.g., the BPQ) are not usually correlated with self-report measures of interoceptive 
accuracy (e.g., confidence ratings or questionnaires of interoceptive accuracy; Garfinkel et 
al., 2015; Murphy, Brewer, Plans et al., 2018), although different self-report measures of 
interoceptive accuracy usually show some correspondence with each other (Murphy, Brewer, 
Plans et al., 2018). One’s beliefs regarding interoceptive attention and one’s beliefs regarding 
interoceptive accuracy therefore appear distinct, an observation not captured by the current 
model that combines these measures under the heading of interoceptive sensibility. Likewise, 
it has been argued that there is typically little relationship between objective interoceptive 
accuracy and interoceptive sensibility (Garfinkel et al., 2015). However, existing data suggest 
that the relationship between objectively measured interoceptive accuracy and self-report 
measures of interoception may differ depending on whether the self-report measure assesses 
accuracy or attention; objectively measured interoceptive accuracy is sometimes associated 
with one’s self-reported beliefs regarding interoceptive accuracy, but not with one’s self-
reported attention to interoceptive signals (e.g., Garfinkel et al., 2015; Murphy, Brewer, Plans 
et al., 2018). 
  
As well as providing a potential explanation for mixed results in the literature, such a 
revision may help researchers to identify the strengths and weaknesses in interoception 
observed across clinical conditions, and to isolate clinically-relevant individual differences. 
For example, an individual with atypical TIPE (heightened attention relative to accuracy) 
may benefit from different treatment than an individual with atypical awareness of 
interoceptive accuracy (confidence-accuracy relationship). Whilst the exact patterning of 
interoceptive processing across disorders remains a question for future research, this 
framework may help to conceptualise potential differences across disorders and, in the future, 
may be useful for translating these findings to clinical practice.  
It is important to acknowledge, of course, that other aspects of interoception that are 
not captured by existing models may hold clinical relevance. For example, individuals may 
differ with respect to the extent that they use interoceptive signals in their everyday lives, in 
addition to the extent to which they can accurately perceive interoceptive signals and the 
extent to which interoceptive signals are the object of attention. Likewise, individuals may 
also differ in terms of how unified their interoceptive attention and/or accuracy is across 
different interoceptive signals (for example, an individual may be extremely good at 
perceiving cardiac signals, but poor at perceiving respiratory or gastric sensations). 
Moreover, it is indeed possible that the relationships between the facets of interoception 
outlined in our 2 x 2 model may differ depending on the interoceptive signal of interest (e.g., 
cardiac vs gastric). At present, our understanding of the clinical relevance of these additional 
aspects of interoception, and the relationship between facets of interoception across 
interoceptive signals, is limited by the paucity of tests designed to assess these possible 
individual differences. However, further work may highlight a need to include additional 
aspects of interoception within this 2 x 2 model.   
  
In summary, with growing interest in interoception, there is a need for a framework 
that adequately distinguishes between the various individual differences in interoception. The 
2 x 2 factorial model provides a refinement of the existing model of interoceptive abilities, 
separating both whether interoceptive accuracy or attention is the target of measurement and 
how interoception is measured. It highlights the existence of two distinct interoception-
related metacognitive measures, and explains mixed results in the literature. It is hoped that 
use of this model will allow researchers to identify the strengths and weaknesses in 
interoception observed across clinical conditions, and to isolate the clinically-relevant 
individual differences in interoception.  
  
Figure 1. Model of interoceptive ability  
Figure 1. a) 2 x 2 factorial model of interoceptive abilities. Factor 1 distinguishes whether 
accuracy or attention is the target of measurement. Factor 2 distinguishes whether a measure 
of objective performance or a self-report measure of beliefs is utilised. Four facets are 
therefore defined: 1) objective interoceptive accuracy; 2) self-reported beliefs concerning 
one’s interoceptive accuracy; 3) objective interoceptive attention; 4) self-reported beliefs 
concerning one’s interoceptive attention. For both accuracy and attention, interoceptive 
awareness can be quantified by comparing one’s self-reported beliefs to the objective 
measure (black arrows). Correspondence across measures within the same measurement 
factor can be quantified (grey arrows) as well as the relationship across different 
measurement and performance factors (white arrows). b) Illustrative tasks that may index 
distinct facets of the model. IAS = Interoceptive Accuracy Scale (Murphy et al., 2018; e.g., 
items such as ‘I can always accurately perceive when my heart is beating fast’). ICQ = 
Interoceptive Confusion Questionnaire (e.g., items such as ‘I am very sensitive to changes in 
my heart-rate’; Brewer et al., 2016). BPQ = Porges Body Perception Questionnaire (items 
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